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The Personal and




Now I should like to look into the thought of Eckhart as the most thorough­
going case in the tradition of negative theology. As is well known, Eckhart 
distinguishes between God and “Godhead” (Gottbeit) which he calls the “es­
sence” of God. Even while making this distinction, however, he did not, of 
course, think in terms of two Gods. Godhead means God being in Himself. 
Eckhart spoke of this Godhead as absolute nothingness.
Absolute nothingness means here the place where every mode of being is 
transcended, not only the various modes of creatural being, but even the modes 
of Divine being, such as the Creator or Divine Love. According to Eckhart, the 
Creator is the aspect of God revealed to creatures, an aspect seen from the 
standpoint of the creatures, and as such it ought to be distinguished from God- 
in-Himself, that is, from the essence of God. It is the same when God is said 
to be Love or to be Good. This essence of God, which transcends every mode 
of being or every aspect, cannot be expressed except by absolute nothingness. 
Strictly speaking, even to say “essence” is already inadequate.
Now, when man is said to have been given the image of God, he has been given 
an image of God in which God includes His own essence as this absolute nothing­
ness. When the image of that “God” comes to action in the soul of man (through 
the working of the Holy Spirit), it is said that man becomes the ‘son of God.’ 
Eckhart calls this the birth of God in the soul.
The incarnation of God in Christ was, as an historical event, the ‘birth of 
God’ in the human world. Eckhart, however, transferred that event to the 
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interior of man’s soul. When man becomes in the above way the living image of 
God, the path for him to penetrate unto the essence of God opens in his soul. 
This is because in the God which is bom within him (the living Christ within 
his soul) there is included not only the whole of God, the so-called Trinity, but 
also the Godhead. Therefore, to ascend that opened path is for the soul gradually 
to enter deep within God, and finally to attain unification with God.
But this unification does not simply mean the two externally approaching, 
meeting, and combining with each other. The whole process rather means that 
the soul comes to have its selfness broken through more and more deeply from 
within the soul itself. What was called the birth of God in the soul is already 
a procedure in which the ‘selfness’ or ‘self-will’ of the soul, the soul’s ego­
centered mode of being, is broken. But this is only the first step. The soul, 
proceeding further, penetrates into God that was bom in the soul. And this 
means no other than that the depth of God, breaking through the soul, comes 
to reveal itself from the innermost recess of the soul. By this, however, the soul 
returns more and more deeply to itself and becomes more and more truly itself.
Eckhart thought of this as the soul’s ‘breaking through’ God. At the ultimate 
consummation of this break-through, the soul reaches absolute nothingness 
which is the essence of God. It reaches the place where there is not a single thing, 
what Eckhart calls the ‘desert’ of Godhead.
While this is the place where the soul is completely deprived of its selfness, 
it is, nevertheless, the final ground of the soul, its bottomless ground, so to 
speak; only when the soul returns here can it truly be itself. At the same time, 
it is the place where God is in Himself: it is the ground of God.
“As God breaks through me, so I, in turn, break through Him. God leads 
my spirit into the desert and into His self-identity, where He is a pure One, 
springing up within Himself.”1
1 zfZw, als er micb dxrchbricbet, also dnrdrbrid* id) in wider. Got leitet disen gist in die 
wiiestung and in die einekeit dn selbes, dd er ein Inter ein nnd in rich sei her qnellende ist. 
(Deutsche Mystiker, ed.Franz Pfeiffer, vol. II. p. 2J2. 1857)
Here one can no longer speak even of unification or union. Eckhart stressed 
that this does not mean to be unified with God (Deo unitum esse), but to be One 
with God (wtum esse cum Deo). (If I may, it is the self-identity of the soul which 
is self-identical with the self-identity of God.) This is for the soul absolute death, 
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a desert; at the same time, it is absolute life, life ‘springing up within itself.”2 
That fountainhead is the fountainhead simultaneously of the eternal life of 
God and of the eternal life of the soul. There God and the soul are the living 
“pure One.” Eckhart expressed this in these well-known words:
2 Life and death are contradictorily opposite in their natures. Seen basically upon the 
ground where each of them presentsitself genuinely in its own nature, they stand in absolute 
distinction, as “eternal” or “absolute” life and death. To that extent the matter is logically 
clear and easy to understand conceptually. But then, at the same time with that absolute 
distinction, there appears the absolute inseparability of life and death. It becomes manifest 
that life and death, though contradictorily opposite in their natures and conceptually 
distinguishable as such, are not two separate things, but rather make one inseparable 
entity, where there is overall distinction but no separation at all. The self-identity of this 
oneness cannot be self-identity in the objective sense, as here it has not to do with the 
oneness of something objective, of some “thing5* or some “being,55 for nothing can be 
constituted out of factors contradicting each other. If any were so constituted, they would 
be meaningless, mere chimeras or fantasies without reality. The oneness in question here 
is absolutely non-objective and absolutely non-objectifiable. Were it taken into any field 
of objectification, it would immediately cease being absolute oneness, and would become an 
object of conceptual thinking, thus falling into the duality of subject and object. The essential 
inseparability of what are essentially or in their natures contradictory, such as life and death 
—their “absolute55 oneness—cannot be understood apart from its non-objective character. 
Its understanding is only possible existentially, through immediate experience in our 
existence, and above all through that experience in the domain of religion. In order to ex­
press the oneness of the above-mentioned kind, the terms “life-rnv-death,55 “affirmation- 
rive-negation,” etc., are here used.
“God’s ground is my soul’s ground; my soul’s ground is God’s 
ground.” “Here I live from my own genuine nature (Eigenscbaff), 
just as God lives from His.”
“The eye with which I see God is the eye with which God sees me.”
Eckhart’s thought is unique in several respects. First, the “essence” of God is 
thought to be found only where the personal “God” which stands in confronta­
tion to created beings is transcended. Second, the “essence” of God or “God­
head” is discovered as absolute nothingness, which presents itself to us more­
over as the place of our absolute death-riw-life. Third, in the “Godhead” alone 
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is it possible for man to be truly himself, and only in the openness of absolute 
nothingness is the consummation of man’s freedom and independence (man’s 
subjectivity) to be found.
Of course, although we say subjectivity, this is not the subjectivity of the 
ego. On the contrary, it is the subjectivity which arises from the absolute death 
of ego (what Eckhart calls Abgescbiedcnbeitf, the subjectivity which arises from 
pure Oneness with God, “pure” in this case indicating the sheerly non-objective 
character of the Oneness here spoken of. For Eckhart, even the so-called umo 
mystica, which in the tradition of mysticism had been regarded as the final stage 
of perfection in mystical experience and which had been assumed to be the 
unification with God (Deo unitum esse), still presupposes God’s Being as the ob­
ject to be united with. There still lies hidden in the background the duality of 
subject and object. The perfect achievement in mystical union is not yet wholly 
free from the eggshell it has broken through. To attain it does not yet mean to 
return to and become aware of the true self. Rather, it means to lose oneself in 
God, in the absolute One. It is from the thoroughgoing pursuit of the subjectivity 
that the very distinction of God and Godhead is made requisite.
Only when “God” is transcended in reaching the absolute nothingness in 
Godhead is the ground of subjectivity found. This is the place of the “uncreated 
1 am.” Eckhart says that the self has been standing there eternally from even 
before the creation of the world and that the self is standing in the Godhead 
even before God speaks his Word. He further considers that it is in the soul’s 
ground that God makes Himself manifest most essentially and that it is there 
that the soul bears witness to God in the actual existence of the soul itself.
However, even though all this is said, the absolute nothingness and the “un­
created I am” in that absolute nothingness are not thought of by Eckhart as 
some kind of self-intoxication in some “imagined” place far removed or isolated 
from reality. On the contrary, Eckhart strongly warns against such tendencies. 
He highly praises the daily life of practical activity. Even though absolute noth­
ingness is spoken of, it is to be lived in the midst of practical life, as that which 
is always open directly within this life. Again, even though speaking of an 
uncreated lam or of the source of eternal life, it is not to be sought in some place 
apart from the “created” self and temporal life, as if it were something other than 
oneself.
In lam, uncreatedness and createdness are subjectively one; in life, etemality 
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and temporality are a living one. Further, this is not the contemplation of God; 
it is beyond all intellectual understanding, including even the intuitive intellec­
tion in the contemplation of God. As was said above, the very distinction be­
tween God and Godhead is connected with the opening up of this way of I am.
Eckhart says, “I flee from God for the sake of God.” “I beg of God that He may 
cause me to be rid of God.” This is probably because “to flee from God for the 
sake of God” means that it is through man’s being truly himself in the nothing­
ness of Godhead that man’s present here-now existence attests “essentially” 
to God.
Eckhart says, further, “In the breaking-through, when I stand emptied of 
my own will, the will of God, all the works of God, and of God Himself, there 
I am beyond all creatures and neither God nor creature but am what I was 
and what I should remain now and forever more.”
With Eckhart, the confrontation between man’s subjectivity (man’s freedom 
and independence) and God, which confrontation is the basic concern of present 
day existentialism, appears in an extremely sharp form. His thought is not, 
however, either the atheism of Nietzsche or the theism of Kierkegaard. In his 
awareness of the “nothingness” of Godhead at the base of the personal “God”, 
he is standing and developing his thought at the “other shore,” beyond both 
theism and atheism, at the place where, conversely, the independence of the 
“soul” is grounded in essential oneness with God’s essence. It will thus be worth 
while to turn our attention now to the difference between this position and the 
position of modem atheistic existentialism.
As mentioned before, Christianity speaks of creatio ex nibilo, beyond which 
mbilum—the ground of ens creatum—is located the abode of God. In atheistic 
existentialism, the existence of such a transcendent God is negated and mbilum 
takes His place. Moreover, that mbilum comes to be realized in the ground of 
man’s subjectivity as the place of the “ecstatic” transcendence of his own ex­
istence, the place of his self-awareness. Thus the mbilum of creatio ex nibilo extends 
right to the abode of God and there becomes abysal. Nibilum appears in atheistic 
existentialism as an abyss within man’s subjectivity.
But in the case of Eckhart, when the “nothingness” of Godhead in the very 
ground of God is seen, this “nothingness” must be said to be even more 
thoroughgoing than the mbilum which contemporary existentialism sees in 
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God’s stead. It may further be said that with Eckhart, man’s subjective self- 
awareness also appears in a more thoroughgoing realization. This can be seen 
in Eckhart’s view that subjective self-awareness arises as absolute affirmation 
coming into being only through absolute negation. The subjectivity of the 
uncreated I am appears only through the complete negation (Abgeicbiedenheit 
or detachment) of the subjectivity of selfness. But the subjectivity of the 
uncreated 1 am is not something different or apart from the I am of a “creature” 
living in the actual world. At all times, lam is only possible as one I am; and it is 
just in I am at its ultimate oneness that absolute affirmation can be found. 
While in Eckhart, man’s true self-awareness is what establishes itself only as 
absolute “negation-nrr-affirmation”, absolute “death-nrr-life,” it figures in 
the context of contemporary existentialism without passing through an 
absolute negation. Here, too, the nibilum appears at the ground of man’s ex­
istential being, making it the place of ecstatic self-awareness. But the self­
transcending character of existential being alone is not yet the absolute nega­
tion of being as being, that is, the absolute nothingness.
Thus Sartre, for example, while taking existence as an ecstatic “project” 
which establishes itself on nothingness, can still view that existence as conscious­
ness. For him, nothingness is not the place where the ego of self-consciousness 
is negated, the place of the negation of ego itself. Insofar as Sartre speaks 
of the existence of the self as an existence which is chosen and posited by the 
self on the ground of nothingness, in that subjectivity freely positing itself 
we see the self affirmation of the subject appear. But this is not yet a self-affirma­
tion which has come through, broken through, the bottom of nothingness.
Nietzsche, on the other hand, already from the time of his The Birth of Tragedy, 
stood on a point which completely transcends the standpoint of the ego. In the 
latter period of his thought the standpoint of absolute “negarion-nw-affirma- 
tion” is fairly clear. But with Nietzsche absolute affirmation—what he calls 
Ja-sagen (Yea-saying)—is established upon something like “life” or “the will 
to power.” In that case it is not sufficiently clear just to what extent the return 
to that basis includes the meaning of the subjective awakening in which the 
self truly becomes itself.
At any rate, Nietzsche does not seem to attain Eckhart’s position of standing 
on the absolute nothingness that is directly beneath actual life. This may be 
taken to mirror the difference between the nothingness of the “God is dead”
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nihilism and the absolute nothingness transcending even “God” as well as the 
difference between life which gushes out of the breaking of the nothingness of 
nihilism and life as absolute ‘death-mv-life.’
If the nothingness of creatio ex nibilo, as a negative standing against the relative 
existence of created being, may be called relative nothingness, and if the noth­
ingness of Godhead in Eckhart, as the place where all beings—including even 
subject-beings—stand in reality, means absolute nothingness, then it may be 
said that the nothingness of Nietzsche’s nihilism is to be called a relative “ab­
solute nothingness.”
It is hoped that even the simple comparison and contrast given above provides 
a glimpse into the significance of Eckhart’s thought. Of course, this thought is 
markedly different from the faith of orthodox Christianity. It was not without 
reason that in his time Eckhart’s thought was regarded as heresy in spite of its 
deep influence. I think, however, that today when man’s subjectivity and the 
confrontation between that subjectivity and God have become great problems, 
Eckhart’s thought is worthy of a new reconsideration.
To make this a little clearer, let us now compare Eckhart’s thought with the 
thought of present-day Christian theology.
For example, according to Emil Brunner in his W'abrbeit all Begegmmg (Truth 
as Encounter}, God is always treated in the Bible as God-toward-man (Gott- 
‘zum-Menscben-bin} and man always as man-from-God (Menscben-von-Gott-ber}. 
For Brunner there is contained in the Bible absolutely no doctrine of God in 
Himself or of man in himself. The relationship between God and man is com­
pletely personal. In this personal relationship man is a free, self-sustaining 
being, “a real standing-against” (ein reales Gegenuber}, confronting God.
Brunner declares (page 38) that “God creates a real standing-against.... God 
wills an actual standing-against. He creates this such that this is not God 
Himself. But God wills that this is so.... The world—above all, man—is a real 
standing-against-God. God Himself so wills it; God Himself has so arranged it. 
Thereby He will stay in all eternity. He Himself gives to His creature a being 
against Himself, a being which is indeed not independent, but which is self- 
sustaining in His dependence. He furnishes the creature with the ability to be 
that which stands against Him—its own self standing against Him”
Such a view expresses in general the accepted notion of Christianity. But
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I think that therein still remains a problem. When it is said that God wills the 
existence of free, self-sustaining creatures as that which really stands against 
God himself, where can the setting up of this free existence occur?
Brunner also says that God inlays into nothingness man’s imago Dei or that 
God “calls” man out of nothingness into being. And just because of this, man 
is thought to be absolutely dependent on God. When, however, creatio ex nibilo 
is spoken of, is that nibilum the place where the free, self-sustaining existence is 
set up? If so, then since that existence is one which is made at every instant to 
return to nibilum at God’s will, even though one speaks of its freedom or self- 
sustainment, these are at root nibilum.
As mentioned before, in contemporary existentialism nibilum is subjectified 
as the place of the self-transcendence of existence. Accordingly, nibilum comes 
to belong to the side of the subject itself. The freedom or independence of the 
subject is thought to belong to an existence which steps over itself into such 
a nibilum.
In contemporary theology, however, nibilum belongs to the side of Divine 
will. Hence, creaturely existence is seen simply as existence, without any self­
transcendence into nibilum. Therefore, though one speaks of the freedom or 
self-sustainment of that existence, these are not rooted within the subject itself. 
They come, after all, to be no more than an apparent or seeming freedom and 
self-sustainment.
To the extent nibilum which depends on God’s will is their base, freedom and 
self-sustainment are not real. Consequently it cannot truly be said that man is a 
“real” standing-against, confonting God, that he is that which is really “not God 
Himself,” and “that which is itself opposite God.” I think that here the problems 
of man’s subjectivization and confrontation with God have not, after all, been 
thought out thoroughly.
When there is posited something which is not God, something which is 
itself by standing against God, then the place where this is posited, i.e., the 
ground of its existence, must be a place which is rather to be characterized as 
the place within God where God is not God Himself. In other words, it must 
be a place which is to be characterized not as the nibilum of creatio ex nibilo but, 
as was seen before in Eckhart, as the Godhead as absolute nothingness. God­
head is the place within God where God is not God Himself.
When it is said that God wills an free existence which stands against God, the 
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place where that will unfolds itself must be thought of as this absolute nothing­
ness. Only in this way does it become possible for the first time to think 
that creatures which are free beings, which are not God, which are themselves 
by standing against God, are nevertheless posited within God.
I have further said that Godhead is where God is not God within God Him­
self This may seem to contradict what I said before about Godhead being that 
place where God is in Himself. But in fact these two statements say the same 
thing. God is God in and by Himself in the absolute nothingness in which God 
is not God Himself. This is no other than to think of ckstarn as applying to the 
existence of God also.
Just as man’s existence can be thought of as subject-existence only when it is 
thought of as ecstatic, so it is only possible to consider the existence of God as 
subject-existence and, moreover, as absolute subject-existence in absolute 
nothingness, when it is thought of as ecstatic.
If we thus take it in a strictly ontological sense that the existence in the case 
of God as well as of man is subject-existence and that this is possible only in 
ekstasis, then it is probably natural to conclude also that, as with Eckhart, the 
place where the consummation of man’s subjectivity reaches finality lies in the 
subjective “Oneness” with God’s subjectivity. This is because the subjective 
coming together of subject and subject can no longer be called “union.”
In short, the mbilum of creatio ex nibilo is also to be characterized as simply 
relative nothingness. The existence which is established on this nibilum can 
never be truly self-existence. Absolute nothingness can be the sole ground upon 
which to posit truly free existence. This, I think, must be the kind of nothingness 
Eckhart meant when he said, “God’s ground is my ground; my ground is God’s 
ground.”
As I have just said, subjective existence is established in ekstasis; that is, it is 
established in the mode of being in which the self has within itself the place 
where it has stepped beyond itself If we proceed a step further, however, such 
a standpoint—ekstasis in this sense—proves to be still insufficient. There 
remains the more inclusive, more thorough position referred to before, that of 
absolute negation-ripr-affirmation. Ehtasis consists in the direction from self 
to the “ground” of self, from God to the ground of God; that is, from being to 
nothingness. Negation-mv-affirmation consists in the direction from nothing­
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ness to being. The difference in the direction indicates a reversal in standpoint. 
(Heidegger’s present thinking of ekstasii from the direction of the “ground”, 
in direct contrast to the direction he thought formerly, also is not without 
reason). Up to now the matter has been considered chiefly from the direction 
of ekstasis; and so, too, with the problem of personality and impersonality. But 
if these issues are to be delved into more deeply, the reverse position just re­
ferred to is necessary.
V
There is no doubt that the idea of man as a personal being is the highest idea 
of man which has thus far appeared. The same may be said as regards the idea 
of God as personal being. Since subjectivity with its self-consciousness came to 
the fore in modem times, the idea of man as a personal being became practically 
self-evident. But is the way of thinking about “person” which has been generally 
prevalent up to now really the only possible way to think about “person”?
In the way of thinking up to now, “person” has been viewed from the stand­
point of person itself. It has been a person-centered idea of person. As has 
already been pointed out, in an ontologically more basic sense, even the self was 
viewed in the modem period from the self-centered perspective of the self, and 
was grasped, in Descartes for example, from the viewpoint of ego co giro. It is the 
same with person. Since ego or person involves by its very nature its own inward 
self-reflection, and can exist as ego or person only in that way, it is only natural 
this way of self-comprehension from within should come about. So long as the 
necessity for a more fundamental reflection does not arise, people automatically 
entertain such a mode of comprehending ego or person.
Person-centered self-interpretation of personal being, however, is never so 
self-evident. It can even be said that such a mode of the person’s grasping of 
itself is already a bias, rooted in the depth of man’s self-consciousness. More 
basically, modem man’s conception of his ego, his ego-centered interpretation 
of his ego, is also a bias, and similarly is never so self-evident as the ego assumes 
it to be. What then does this bias mean? It means that the self-immanence, in 
the perspective of which man catches his ego or his own personality, necessarily 
signifies a sort of confinement, in which his self-being is caught; a confinement 
where lingers inevitably the mode of man’s being captured in and by himself, 
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or even of his self-captivation, so-called narcissism.
Person is rather an appearance or phenomenon that appears from that which 
cannot be itself called “personal” and, moreover, contains in its nature no form of 
confinement. Although I have said phenomenon, it does not mean that which 
stands in contrast to the thing-in-itself, as in Kant. Here it would be a mistake 
to think that there is some thing-in-itself existing apart from the phenomenon, 
or that this thing-in-itself would make an appearance in some form different 
from its own, like an actor who puts on a mask. The interpretation of the person 
as a phenomenon does not mean that “person” is an interim guise similar to 
a mask which one can arbitrarily wear for a while and then put aside. To 
think of person in such a way is to lose sight of the subjectivity which makes 
the core of being personal, and which involves the subject always determining 
itself.
It is said that the old concept ofpersona originally implied such a mask. When 
I say that person is a phenomenon, however, I do not mean that there is some 
different “thing”—like an actor behind a mask—behind personal being. Person 
is an appearance with nothing behind it which might make an appearance. 
Behind person there is nothing at all; that is, behind it lies absolute nothingness.
While this absolute nothingness is wholly other to the person and means the 
absolute negation of the person, it is not something different from the person. 
Absolute nothingness is that which, becoming one with that “being” called 
person, brings into being that person. Accordingly, the previously used 
expressions, “there is absolute nothingness,” and “it it behind,” are, in fact, 
inaccurate. Nothingness is not a thing which is nothingness. Also, to say “behind 
the person” is already to set up a duality. Again, although I said that this 
absolute nothingness is something wholly other, this does not mean that there 
is something which is wholly other. Rather, there not being even any nothing­
ness is true nothingness, absolute nothingness.
Generally, “nothingness” is made to stand in contrast of “being”, function­
ing as negativity in that relationship, and is thus conceived as something which 
“is” nothingness. In Western thinking, this seems to be especially conspicuous. 
It is even so as regards what is thought of as nihility in the so-called nihilism. 
Insofar as one stops at such a way of thinking, nothingness is only a concept, 
a nothingness merely in thought. Absolute nothingness, in which even that 
which “is” nothingness is negated, is not nothingness merely thought but
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nothingness which can only be lived. I said previously that behind the person 
there is nothing at all, and that absolute nothingness lies behind it, but this can 
never be simply a conceptual negation. It rather means the opening up of 
absolute nothingness as an existential turn-about, away from the mode of being 
of the person-centered person. If it is admitted that the person-centered grasp 
of person is, as I stated above, intertwined at the very source of the mode of 
personal being with the essence of the “person,” then the negation of person- 
centeredness must mean an existential self-negation of man as “person.” The 
shift of man as person from person-centered self-apprehension to self-opening 
as the realization of absolute nothingness (of which I shall speak next) ought 
to be an existential turn-about, a kind of conversion, within man himself.
Such an existential tuming-about involves extricating oneself and coming 
out from the person-centered mode of being, finding oneself on the hither shore 
of that mode of personal being, close to the immediacy of the actual self. Then 
the “nothing” that was found behind the person comes to open up on the side 
of one’s self, or, rather, as one’s original self.
If person is regarded as the ultimate mode of man’s being, “behind” which 
there is nothing, that is because the matter is seen from the side of the person. 
Seen from this side, nothingness remains an envisioned nothing, a nothing 
which is a matter of thought. When, however, “there is not anything” opens 
up on the hither shore of the personal self as the sheer self, then nothingness 
comes to be really realized in the self as the true self. Then it is experienced 
bodily in the self. Self-being in the sense spoken of above comes to be the real­
ization of nothingness. “Bodily experiencing” is not envisioning. It is, if I may, 
as is expressed in the phrase “unseeing seeing,” to see without seeing. The true 
nothingness is a living nothingness, and a living nothingness can only be self­
attested.
In such an existential turn-about, however, the self does not cease to be a 
personal being. What is left behind is only the person-centered mode of seizing 
the person, that is, the mode of the person in which it is caught in itself. But in 
that very turn-about the personal mode of being becomes more real and more 
close to the self, and appears as it really and truly is. When the person-centered 
grasp of the person is broken and nothingness comes to be real, realizing itself 
actually in the self, then personal existence also comes to true realization in the 
self. This is what is meant by absolute “negation-nrr-afiirmation.” Here, what 
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is called one’s personality is established in oneness with absolute nothingness. 
Without a living nothingness and an existential turn-about, this cannot be 
understood.
This is what I meant when I stated above that person is an appearance without 
anything behind it to take that appearance. Person comes into being in oneness 
with absolute nothingness, as that in which absolute nothingness presents 
itself. It comes into being as “formless form.”
It can also be said that person in this sense is a mask, as in the old notion of 
persona, a “face” that an actor puts on, thereby indicating the role he is about to 
play on the stage. However, it is a mask worn by absolute nothingness. It may 
even be said to be a mask in the ordinary sense, a guise or semblance borrowed 
or assumed, temporary or provisional.
To say, however, that person is a mask does not mean that there is something 
“true” or “real” separate from it, that it is something artificially contrived for 
deception, or that person is a mere illusory appearance. Person is thoroughly 
real; it is the realest reality. It comes into being alone as man’s real mode of 
being which does not contain the slightest deception or artificiality. But, at 
the same time, it is fundamentally temporary and provisional. This is because 
personal being is the highest being, which comes into being in oneness with 
absolute nothingness, which then presents itself. Man thus comes into being 
as absolute nothingness-npf-being at the root of the personal way of being. In 
Buddhistic terms (in the Tendai school), it can probably be said that man comes 
into being as the “Middle” of “Temporary-provisory being” and the “Void.”
Dostoevsky often speaks of “face”. In his usage “face” seems to mean man’s 
mystical aspect which lies hidden in the depths of his personality. Nietzsche 
also, in Beyond Good and Evil and elsewhere, frequently speaks of “mask”. “Every­
thing deep loves masks... All of deep spirit need a mask; even more, around 
everyone of deep spirit a mask constantly grows.”3 This is a deep insight, preg­
nant with subtleties, and characteristic of Nietzsche. The face or mask they 
speak of has something in common with the meaning of mask in the afore-men­
tioned standpoint of absolute nothingness-nrr-being, being-np^-nothingness; 
still, it is different.
3 Beyond Good and Evil, Second Art., 40.
Personality is, unconditionally, something living. Even though we regard 
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it as “spirit”, it is as such—without thereby ceasing to be a living spirit—a 
mask of absolute nothingness. Were nothingness thought of apart from its 
mask, it would become an idea. Were we to deal with the mask apart from 
nothingness, personality would invariably be self-centered. The living act­
ivity of personality is, just as it is, a realization of absolute nothingness. And 
spirit is, just as it is, in oneness with the supra- and non-spiritual, a manifesta­
tion of the latter. In such a way alone does personality truly come to establish 
itself as reality.
This is no longer the subjectivity usually attributed to personality. Rather, 
it is the very negation of that subjectivity ascribed to personality, or, more 
fundamentally, of that subjectivity a person ascribes to itself in its person­
centered interpretation. This negation signifies a turn-about that occurs in that 
self-confined person, an egress of a life power that is entirely new. It is the very 
key to the door of the cell, closed since the beginning (“beginningless beginn­
ing”) of personal being, lying hidden in the innermost depth of our personality. 
It is through this negation that the person is broken through from within and 
personal being comes to reveal itself as subjectivity in its authentic and original 
character, as the truly absolute Selfhood.
For instance, Gasan Joseki (1275-1365), a Soto Zen master of Japan five gen­
erations after Dogen, wrote this inscription over a portrait of himself:
The conscious mind of this shadowy man, 
At all occasions is to me most familiar— 
From long ago mysteriously wondrous, 
It is neither I nor other.
The self as human existence, the self as a real being in the actual w'orld, the 
whole self ranging from personality to the bodily flesh, is here called a “shadowy 
man.” The conscious mind of this man, that is, the various activities of persona­
lity and consciousness, from thinking, feeling, and will, to sensations and 
actions, are all equally shadows.
“Shadow” here is used in the same sense as the aforementioned “temporary­
provisional,” meaning what is entirely unreal. All those activities are unreal, 
because they present themselves as they are only in oneness with absolute 
nothingness. But, precisely in that they are at the same time ultimately real, 
because they are no other than the realization of absolute Selfhood. The ab­
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solute Selfhood opens up as a non-objectifiable nothingness through the turn­
about which occurs from within the personal self. With that turn-about every 
bodily, mental, and spiritual activity that belongs to a person appears as a 
shadowy act of a phantom player on the now opened stage of nothingness.
This stage is opened on the hither shore of the personal self. What kind of 
place does this suggest? It is the outermost place the personal self commonly 
sees outside itself and calls the external world; it is the outermost world, actually 
present here and now, ever changing. At the same time it is the place of nothing­
ness burst out from within the innermost depth of the personal self; it is the 
ultimate realization and expression of the non-objectifiable—and in that sense 
fundamentally subjective—nothingness. It is the place beyond the innermost 
depth, where it transcends itself and turns into the outermost. It is the place of 
de-in temalization, so to speak. Here, the “outer” is more “inner” than the 
inmost. The so-called “outer world” emerges here as a self-realization of the 
non-objectifiable nothingness, or rather it comes to appear, as it is, in oneness 
with the nothingness.
At any rate, beyond the outer and the inner the place of man’s true existence 
opens up, man being there a shadowy man in oneness with the absolute Selfhood. 
There is here an absolute self-identity. While thinking, feeling and action are, 
in every actual occasion, entirely temporary and provisional, an appearance with 
nothing behind it, or a shadowy consciousness of a shadowy man, yet they 
are, at each occasion, one with the selfhood which is aware of itself as the 
absolute, non-objectifiable nothingness beyond all time. This oneness is a self­
identity. To one’s self which stands in the absolute Selfhood, those activities of 
consciousness are “most familiar.”
Still, the place where the self here stands is not the standpoint of mere person­
ality or of mere consciousness. It is the place of nothingness. It is not the stand­
point of personality dwelling merely in itself, nor that of consciousness merely 
self-immanent. Insofar as the place of nothingness is totally one with personality 
or consciousness, the whole of this oneness is present inside personality or con­
sciousness. But, conversely, insofar as personality and consciousness can be what 
they are only in oneness with absolute nothingness, the same whole oneness 
stands ecstatically outside personality and consciousness. And that absolute 
“inside” and this absolute “outside” are also one and the same. What renders 
this possible is that the ground of personal being is no other than absolute 
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nothingness, i.e. absolute nothingness-nxv-being, absolute being-ripe-nothing- 
ness. Because personal being and its conscious mind are wholly one with 
absolute Selfhood, they are utterly real in their true suchness. Because they are 
wholly different from it, they are utterly provisional and shadow-like. For this 
reason, the utterly unreal conscious mind of the shadowy man, although it 
arises at every instant, being thus entirely temporary and entirely in the 
world of Time, yet at the same time, it is, just as it is in its temporality, ecstati­
cally outside Time at each instant. It is entirely “eternal” in its being entirely 
“temporal.” Arising and vanishing now, at this very instant, the conscious 
mind of the shadow-figure is, as such, at each time and place at all occasions, 
“from long ago mysteriously wondrous.”
The self in this absolute Selfhood is not what is ordinarily termed the personal 
or conscious self, the so-called ego. Still, at the same time, it is that very personal 
or conscious self. It is not another man; it is not another, and it is not man. 
For, while the self and the other as “men” are entirely different from each 
other, “man” (that is, conscious personality) is, in spite of all his living activities 
and modes of being, fundamentally an appearance which is presenting itself as 
“man” in oneness with what is not “man”, i.e. with absolute nothingness. 
Looked at from that aspect, every “man” is, just as he is in his real suchness, 
not “man”, i.e. he is impersonal. In other words, he is “man” as an appearance 
with “nothing” behind it, of which he is an appearance.
As we ordinarily exist in the form of personally conscious self-being, we take 
the self and the other—as “men”—for two absolute existences. But viewed 
on the plane which is more immediate than that of personal self-being, the self 
and the other, though absolutely two as “persons”, yet at the same time are, 
in their very duality, absolutely non-dual in their impersonality. It is only from 
such a standpoint that we can say the conscious mind of the shadowy person is, 
just as it is, “neither I nor other.” This is the standpoint of absolute selfhood, 
of the true self. This true self is personal-hw-impcrsonal, impersonal-mv- 
personal.
Here is Gasan Joseki’s death poem:
It is ninety-one years
This midnight, as always,
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I lay myself down in the Yellow Springs.4
4 Yellow Springs—the Underworld; Hades.
5 As, according to Eckhart, the ground of God’s Being (GotteifTuntT) is the ground of 
my being (SeelengntruT) and vice versa, the self of this “of Itself” is at once the soul’s true 
Selfhood.
The absolute Selfhood which is described in terms of “neither I nor other” is 
the self of man into which “skin and flesh were composed;” it is man’s actual 
existence itself, and his personal and conscious activities themselves. But at the 
same time, it is, in the midst of these activities, always ecstatic and always 
remaining intact, always “laying itself down in the Yellow Springs.” On all 
occasions of man’s life, it is absolutely death-ripe-life, life-rire-dcath; absolutely 
being-r/w-nothingness, nothingness-ripe-being. Eckhart also said that man’s 
soul finds in the desert of Godhead, in the Nothingness beyond even God’s 
Being, which is the place of the soul’s absolute death, the spring of eternal 
Life, the soul’s own eternal life, incessantly gushing up of Itself.5
From the standpoint of absolute Selfhood, however, not only life, but death 
also belongs to the self. Life and death are both aspects of the absolute Selfhood; 
each aspect being an actual occurrence of that Selfhood. Of course, life and death 
always arise entirely in Time. Or rather, they are essentially temporal through 
and through. But at the same time, life and death are, at every instant, just as 
they are in their temporality, ecstatic in their is-ness; they are ecstatically. 
Basically, viewed from the absolute Selfhood, there is no change at the time of 
death. That is why in the previously quoted death verse, we find the words, 
“This midnight, as always.”
This reminds us of Nietzsche’s “midnight and noon have become one.” In 
fact, that the absolute life-ripe-death, death-ripe-life presents itself at every 
instant of man’s life can be said to signify that, although midnight, yet it falls 
at noon, at a time of shining sunlight. When Baso, the Chinese Zen master of 
the eighth century, lay seriously ill in bed and was asked of his condition, he 
replied, “sun-faced Buddha, moon-faced Buddha.” Groaning with pain, breath­
ing one’s last, are, as they are, “sun-faced Buddha, moon-faced Buddha.”
It is entirely the same with the remark of Vimalakirti in the Kimalakirti 
Sutra, that he suffers illness because all sentient beings suffer illness. His 
illness is indeed an actual illness. Although it is true that his is an illness of 
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Great Compassion in response to that of all living beings, there must not be 
in that interpretation even the slightest implication of pretended illness. 
Also, it must never be understood in a metaphorical or symbolic sense. So 
long as the illness all living beings suffer is real, the suffering which Vimalakirti, 
standing on the plane of absolute non-duality of self and other, undergoes 
should be no less real. He suffers from an illness which is thoroughly real.
Nevertheless, his suffering is said to be “empty.” This does not mean that 
somewhere “behind” or “at the ground of’ the real illness and apart from it 
there is health. This means that the absolutely real illness is, just as it is, 
“emptiness.” There is a saying that water does not make water wet and fire 
does not bum fire. This suggests the central meaning of emptiness. So long as 
water cannot make something wet, water is not water; and so long as fire cannot 
bum something, fire is not fire. But to say that water does not make water wet 
does not mean that water is in fact not water; on the contrary, it means that 
water is really water, that is, water in its suchness. The suchness and the real 
form of water is “emptiness.” Only in formlessness does a thing truly make 
its appearance. This is precisely what Vimalakirti means when he says, “My 
illness has no form and is invisible.”
I said previously that the real form of all things inclusive of human beings is 
established in the so-called double exposure of life and death; all living beings 
can as well be seen under the aspect of death without thereby being apart from 
that of life. Such a real feature of things must, fundamentally speaking, be com­
prehended from the base of the absolute being-nrr-nothingness, nothingness- 
rizv-being, or of the absolute non-duality of life and death I have just described. 
Only on this base would it be possible to pursue the problem of science and 
religion.
Translated by Rev. Jan Van Bragt and Yamamoto Seisaku
Errata. Please note the following corrections in the first part of this article (Vol. HI 
No. I).
Page 7, last line: For reality is what has heretofore been termed “life” by the religions. 
read reality is the so-called “materiality,” and the sectional cut which reveals the life 
aspect is what has heretofore been termed “life” by religions.
Page II, line 28: For Dionysius read Dionysos
Page 15, footnote line 5: For Dharma read Dharma-body.
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